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Value Relevance of the Multi-step 
Income Statement in Japan 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between value relevance of the multi-step income statement and 
managerial opportunistic behavior. In Japan, net income is disclosed by three steps, i.e., 1) operating profits 
from core operating activity, 2) ordinary income, measured by adding gains and losses from non-core operating 
and financing activities to operating profits, and 3) net income that is bottom line performance in the income 
statement. While Japanese firms achieve income smoothing, loss avoidance and big bath, the managerial 
opportunistic behavior is simply identified by the observation of multi performance measures. We find that the 
firms doing income smoothing, loss avoidance and big bath, which are identified by the multi-step income 
statement, have the different value relevance of earnings from other firms. In many cases, earnings 
management decreases the value relevance of earnings. The results suggest that the multi-step income 
statement enables investors to detect earnings management without apparent difficulty and that earnings 
become more useful when investors use the information contained in it. 
 
Keywords: multi-step income statement, value relevance, earnings management, income smoothing, loss 
avoidance, big bath 
 
 
1.  Format  of  income  statement 
Recently, performance reporting is a hot issue in the international convergence of financial 
accounting standards. As for performance reporting, not only the reporting format but also the concept of 
income and the definition of performance are debated. Those are very complicated problems and seem to 
be difficult to solve immediately. Besides the traditional issues on measurement and recognition, whether 
the bottom line of the income statement should be net income or comprehensive income and whether 
performance measure of the bottom line should be the income for shareholders of the parent company or 
the income of consolidated economic unit are very important issues, too. In addition, whether   3
performance measure in the income statement should be divided into some components (disclose some 
subtotals) or not (disclose only single statement) is also a basic issue. This research examines the issue on 
the format of income statement. 
  Japanese GAAP requires public companies to disclose the multi-step income statement. In the 
first step, operating profits form core operating activities is disclosed in the multi-step income statement. . 
It is measured by deducting operating expenses and administrative expenses from operating revenues. In 
the second step, gains and losses (including interest expenses) form non-core operating and financing 
activities are added to (deducted from) operating profits, then ordinary income is disclosed. Since 
ordinary income does not include non-recurring components, it corresponds to earnings in usual meaning. 
Ordinary income is regarded as a proxy of normal earnings generating power of the firm in Japan. Finally 
net income is disclosed on the bottom line of income statement. Net income is measured by adding 
impermanent items and taxes to ordinary income. The impermanent items are composed of special items, 
extra-ordinary items, and non-recurring items such as asset write-downs and write-offs, restructuring 
charges, gains from sales of operating assets and settlement of investment securities, losses form the 
discontinued business. In sum, Japanese income statement discloses three step measurements of net 
income and display two subtotals, i.e. operating profits and ordinary income. 
  The defects of the multi-step income statement, which have been used for a long time in Japan, 
are repeatedly criticized. It is complained that because this format permits the discretion on the 
classification of components of net income, managers may manipulate the classification for earnings 
management. It is well known that the same issue is recently closed up as with “pro-forma” reporting 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2004). Advocates for single statements persist that the manipulation of classification 
would be diminished by prohibiting the multi-step statement. However the prohibition of subtotal 
disclosure would extinguish only the manipulation of classification. The manipulation of earnings 
allocation across years cannot be extinguished by the reform of disclosure format. On the contrary, if 
earnings management on allocation, which could be easily detected by noticing operating profits or 
ordinary income, would not be detected in single statement, the information value of performance 
reporting for investors would decline. 
This paper investigates the value relevance of the multi-step income statement by using   4
Japanese firms’ data. This research examines not only the time-series trend of earnings (net income) but 
also the relationship between performance measures of each step in the year. We hypothesize that the 
value relevance of earnings (net income) is affected by managerial opportunistic behavior because the 
sophisticated investors who find the abnormal behavior of earnings components may discount the 
performance of the firm. The results show that the firms achieving income smoothing, loss avoidance, 
and big bath, which are identified by the relationship between multi performance measures, have the 
different relevance of earnings (net income) from other firms. In many cases, the coefficient 
(capitalization multiple) on performance measure for firms managing earnings is lower than others. 
Therefore, earnings management seems to decrease the value relevance of earnings and net income. Our 
hypothesis is supported. The empirical results in this paper imply that the multi-step income statement 
enables investors to detect the earnings management and that earnings and net income becomes more 
useful when investors use the information contained in it. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of prior 
studies related to our research and discusses our hypothesis and empirical model. Sections 3 to 5 pick up 
the archetypes of earnings management, income smoothing, loss avoidance, big bath, respectively. The 
last section provides concluding remarks. 
 
2.    Prior studies and hypothesis development 
  Every manager has a certain preference over the earnings stream and behaves for self interest 
on his or her preference. On the other hand, investors anticipate the future cash flows of the firm based on 
the past stream of earnings and estimate the value of the firm. Even if two firms have the same stream of 
earnings, the firm value can be different form each other when the expected cash flows differ. In such a 
case, the association between earnings and firm value, namely the value relevance of earnings is different. 
While a firm creates some patterns of earnings allocation across years by earnings management, the 
sophisticated investors estimate the firm value with care on the allocation process chosen by managers. 
Therefore, if the trace of manipulating would appear in the relationship between subtotals (or bottom line) 
in the income statement and in their time-series trends, we could observe the different relevance of 
ordinary income and net income according to each allocation pattern.   5
  Barth et al. (1999) is a precursor, which examines the effect of earnings momentum on the 
value relevance. Although they focus on the earrings streams that are the products by earnings 
management, they do not pay sufficient attention to the methods or means used for earnings management 
that leave impressions in the income statement. In general, the studies on the discretionary management 
of accruals by managers and on the value relevance of them investigate only the pattern of earnings 
allocation. However, some studies so not base on the assumptions on the rational decision making by 
managers and investors. The research that thoughtlessly regards loan loss privations of banks as a 
signaling and the research on the IPO firms, which maintain that IPO firms myopically manipulate 
earnings just before IPO and naïve investors are repeatedly deceived, are typical examples.   
  On the other hand, Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) is a distinguished research, which has 
rational assumptions both on managers and investors. They point out that the value relevance of earnings 
sometimes decreases according to the type of earnings management. Their conclusion is quite reasonable 
because investors are sufficiently rational. Since the relevance of earnings is determined by the 
association between earnings and expected future cash flows, earnings management does not always 
decrease the relevance of earnings. In this research, though we stand on the same point of view as 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004a), we do not investigate the incentives of managers nor the decision 
making process of investors. We investigate only how the difference in the value relevance of earnings 
can be observed when some firms seem to achieving earnings management, which are identified by the 
relationship between subtotals and the trends of each performance measure in the multi-step income 
statement. 
  In addition to earnings management, our research is also related to accounting literature on 
accruals quality. Since a seminal paper of Sloan (1996), it is in the spotlight that accruals, less persistent 
than cash flows, are more highly valued in the capital market than cash flows. Recently, the quality and 
value relevance of special items are the center of concern in academics. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004b) 
detect that special items are utilized for earnings management and they insist the possibility that means 
for earnings management will be different in the contexts. Although special items are transitory, 
Burgstahler et al. (2002) report that stock price does not fully reflect the information contents for future 
earnings that special items imply. Similarly, Dechow and Ge (2005) also point out that mis-pricing of   6
special items is a major source of accruals anomaly. If special items were used for earnings management 
and investors could only incompletely and uncertainly know the cause and effect of earnings management, 
then information asymmetry between managers and investors become more serious. Earnings 
management would make earnings and income much noisier and decrease their value relevance (Francis 
et al., 2005). Similar to Zhaoyang and Chen (2005), our research investigates the relevance of earnings 
and income on the assumption that the rational investors differently value earnings components used for 
earnings management relative to when not used for earnings management. 
  In the following analysis, first, we choose the earnings management samples (target samples) 
by noticing 1) the levels of operating profits, ordinary income and net income, 2) the sign of changes in 
them compared with those of the previous year, and 3) the magnitude of their changes. Second, we 
investigate the difference in the value relevance of ordinary income and net income between the target 
samples and others. Since the above mentioned information 1) to 3) is only abstracted from the multi-step 
income statement, if the value relevance of earnings or net income is different between target samples and 
others, those results represent the rationality of current statement form in Japan. At the same time, the 
results will be powerful counter evidence against the proposal of single statement. 
  The earnings capitalization model is adopted in this paper for examining the value relevance 
and group dummy (binary) variables are used in OLS estimation for testing the difference in the value 
relevance among subgroups. The research hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis: The value relevance of firms achieving earnings management, which is detected by the 
multi-step performance information, is different from others. In the meaning that investors can detect 
those firms, the multi-step income statement is value relevant. 
 
  In order to investigate whether the multi-step income statement is value relevant or not, it is 
sufficient to confirm the significance of the difference in coefficients on performance measure (ordinary 
income and net income) between target samples and others. The sign of the coefficient is not the main 
concern. The choice of target samples, which means the identification of earnings management, is 
mechanically executed using the multi-step performance measure and the incentives of earnings   7
management is not speculated as described above. Our focus is on the abnormal or unnatural movement 
(relations) of multi-step performance measures, while we neglect whether they are intentionally created 
by managers or not. 
  Table 1 presents our sample. Manufacturing sector consists of 18 industries; fishery, mining, 
foods, fiber and textile, paper and pulp, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber and tire, ceramics, steel, metal, 
machinery, electronics, automobiles, other transportation vehicles, precise products, ship building and 
other. Data is retrieved from NIKKEI NEEDS CORPORATE FINANCIAL DATA. However, because 
some data need to be hand collected, we choose the firms listed on top 50 largest sales in each industry in 
1999. Therefore, these samples are slightly biased toward the large size of operating volume. However, 
our sample covers the typical and famous Japanese firms and so we believe that our sample have the 
representativeness of Japanese manufacturing sector. Fiscal year of our sample ends on March. 
Non-manufacturing (commercial and service) sector consists of 12 industries; real estate, construction, 
retail, service, trading and wholesale, marine, land transportation, warehouse, railroads, gas, oil and 
petroleum, and electricity. All listed firms of March ending fiscal year in non-Manufacturing sector are 
included in our sample. 
All financial data of our sample is that of parent only statements. In Japan, many firms adopted 
6 months fiscal year (closed semi-annually) before 1978, so our investigation period starts from 1978 
fiscal year which closes on March 1979. In 2000, new accounting standard of the consolidation policy, 
which adopts the concept of substantial control, was promulgated and the consolidated financial 
statements become main financial statements since 2000 in Japan. Therefore, our investigation period 
ends in 1998 fiscal year which closes on March 1999. All data of stock prices is collected form 
TOYO-KEIZAI KABUKA CD-ROM. 
  In the following sections, we estimate the coefficients by cross-sectional regression and 
synthesize them in each period by the method in Fama and MacBeth (1973). For cross-sectional 
estimation, we adopt Huber-White t value which uses a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
We use T, which is a test statistics of Fama-MacBeth method, in the following tables to avoid confusion. 
  Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of variables used in our analysis, which are yen 
per share. Our investigation period covers 21 fiscal years, as explained above. While we synthesize the   8
estimated results over full period, we report the results in sub-periods. The reason for dividing into 
sub-periods is that the value relevance of earnings depends on the economic environments in each 
sub-period. We divide the investigation period into three sub-periods; 1) March 1979 – March 1985, 2) 
March 1986 – March 1992, 3) March 1993 – March 1999. Every sub-period equally contains 7 fiscal 
years. In Japan, the first period is normal and rather stable. The second period is boom or bubble economy. 
The third period is under depression. Because of the limitation of space, we do not report the estimated 
results of the constant term and industry dummies. Year in Tables represents the ending point. For 
example, 1979 represents the fiscal year that ends on March 1979. 
 
3.  Income  smoothing  
3.1 Identification of income smoothing firms 
3.1.1 Identification by the sign of changes in performance 
  Income smoothing is an activity to alleviate the time-series volatility of performance. Although 
many studies investigate on income smoothing for a long time, some problems remain unresolved yet and 
a behavior of income smoothing is still a puzzle in academics. Buckmaster (2001) extensively and 
exquisitely surveys prior research on income smoothing. Recently, it is widely perceived that the capital 
cost of income smoothing firm is lower and then income smoothing increases the value of the firm 
(Mikhail et al., 2004). Moreover, some research provide the empirical results supporting the hypothesis 
that income smoothing behavior communicates the manager’s prospects for future performance to 
investors in capital market (Srinidhi et al., 2001, Obinata, 2004). 
  However, it is often alleged that the artificially smoothed income by earnings management is 
less value relevant than naturally smoothed income. In fact, Bao and Bao (2004) report that stock price 
for smoothed income firms is higher relative to un-smoothed income firms and that the stock price is 
higher when the the ratio of cash earnings (accruals) to earnings is higher (lower). Their conclusion is 
consistent with recent common knowledge that because most accruals revert in the long run, accruals are 
less persistent than cash earnings. Our research considers the similar point to Bao and Bao (2004). 
  In general, the target or goal of income smoothing is not observable from outside of firms. 
What is the target of income smoothing may be just an empirical issue. In empirical research, we can only   9
presume the hypothetical target. We presume, in this paper, that the target of income smoothing is the 
level of performance in the previous year. The firms, which seem to alleviate the changes in ordinary 
income (earnings) or net income, are regarded as income smoothing samples. 
Three sets of income smoothing are discriminated though each other is not necessarily 
exclusive. First, we identify two types of income smoothing; 1) the change in ordinary income is negative 
while the change in operating profits is positive (income decreasing type), 2) the change in ordinary 
income is positive while the change in operating profits is negative (income increasing type). These two 
types are identified on the assumption that the ordinary income is the target. Second, we identify another 
set of income smoothing based on the behavior of net income; 3) the change in net income is negative 
while the change in ordinary income is positive (income decreasing type), 4) the change in net income is 
positive while the change in ordinary income is negative (income increasing type). 
  In Japan, many people have the impression that firms smooth net income by manipulating 
special items, especially asset write-offs and asset settlement. So, finally, we identify the third set of 
income smoothing considering ways and means; 5) the change in net income is negative while the 
changes in both operating profits and ordinary income are positive (income decreasing type), 6) the 
change in net income is positive while the changes in both operating profits and ordinary income are 
negative (income increasing type). 
  Regression models used in our analysis are as follows: 
 
it j j it it it it it u D OI SM OI SM OI SM OI P + + + + + + = ∑γ β β β β α 13 4 12 3 11 2 1  (1) 
 it j j it it it it it u D NI SM NI SM NI SM NI P + + + + + + = ∑γ β β β β α 23 4 22 3 21 2 1  (2) 
 it j j it it it it it u D NI SM NI SM NI SM NI P + + + + + + = ∑γ β β β β α 33 4 32 3 31 2 1  (3) 
 
where P is stock prices on the end of fiscal year, OI is ordinary income (per share), NI is net income (per 
share), Djs are industry dummies, and u is a error term. For mitigating the effect of heteroskedasticity, 
stock price, ordinary income, and net income are deflated by stock price of beginning-of-year. SMs are 
group dummies (binary variables) based on three sets of income smoothing types. The grouping criteria 
are as follows. In the following explanation, OP presents operating profits and  ∆ presents the changes   10
compared with that of previous year. 
 
Equation (1); 
SM11 is unity if  ∆OI is negative while  ∆OP is positive, zero otherwise. 
SM12 is unity if  ∆OI is positive while  ∆OP is negative, zero otherwise. 
SM13 is unity if both  ∆OP and∆OI are negative, zero otherwise. 
Equation (2); 
SM21 is unity if  ∆NI is negative while  ∆OI is positive, zero otherwise. 
SM22 is unity if  ∆NI is positive while  ∆OI is negative, zero otherwise. 
SM23 is unity if both  ∆OI and∆NI are negative, zero otherwise. 
Equation (3); 
SM31 is unity if  ∆NI is negative while both  ∆OP and∆OI are positive, zero otherwise. 
SM32 is unity if  ∆NI is positive while both  ∆OP and∆OI are negative, zero otherwise. 
SM33 is unity if all of  ∆OP,  ∆OI,  ∆NI are negative, zero otherwise. 
 
  In testing the above explained hypothesis, we examine the significance of coefficients on 
interaction terms of performance with group dummies as SMk1 (income decreasing type) and SMk2 
(income increasing type). We include SMk3 in the regressions to correct the downward bias of negative 
changes, which affects the estimation of  1 β   and influences the estimation of  2 β  and  3 β . 
  The firms with dummies SMk1 and SMk2 have the opposite sign of changes in the different 
performance measures in the income statement. This pattern implies income smoothing in the meaning 
that firms mitigate the changes in performance. However, it seems to be an overreaction. It may be careful 
to notify, in advance, that this type may include creative accounting or conservatism other than income 
smoothing, too. 
3.1.2 Identification by the magnitude of changes in performance 
  In this sub-section, our focus is on the firm behavior of alleviating large changes for income 
smoothing. When the change in operating profits is very large, other things being equal, the change 
affects ordinary income and net income in the same direction. On the contrary, in the case where ordinary   11
income or net income are not affected by a large change in operating profits, gains and losses form 
financing or unusual activities should compensate for a large shock in operating performance to smooth 
ordinary income and net income. In this paper, we name the above median change as a “large” change. 
We measure, in each year, the industry median of the absolute value of changes deflated by stock prices 
of begging-of-year ( 1 | | − ∆ t t P X ). The reason for using the industry median in each year is that the 
magnitude of changes in performance varies year by year and industry by industry and that we cannot 
correctly know the distribution function of their changes. The firms, which do not experience a large 
change in lower-step performance while the change in upper-step performance is above the median in the 
same year, are defined as income smoothing firms. This definition may more faithfully correspond to the 
usual meaning of income smoothing than that in aforementioned sub-section. 
  The regression models are as follows: 
 
it j j it it it it u D OI UP OI DN OI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 1 3 1 2 1  (4) 
 it j j it it it it u D NI UP NI DN NI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 2 3 2 2 1  (5) 
 
where DN1 is unity if, while the positive change in operating profits is above the median, the change in 
ordinary income is less than the median, zero otherwise, and UP1 is unity, in reverse, if the negative 
change in operating profits is above the median while the change in ordinary income is less than the 
median. In equation (4), ordinary income is regarded as the target of income smoothing. In the similar 
fashion, dummies in equation (5) are given to the firms that do not experience a large change in net 
income while the change in ordinary income is above the median. It is presumed that the target of income 
smoothing is net income in equation (5). 
 
3.2 Results of analysis 
  Table 3 presents the results of regression. Panel A reports the estimation results of model (1) 
concerning the sign of changes in operating profits and ordinary income. Coefficients on the interaction 
term of income decreasing type (SM11OI) are significantly negative almost at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector over every period. Similarly, coefficients on the   12
interaction term of income increasing type (SM12OI) are significantly negative almost at the 0.05 level, 
except for the third period in manufacturing sector and for the second period in non-manufacturing sector. 
The results of estimation for regression model (2) concerning the sign of ordinary income and net income 
are reported in Panel B. We find that coefficients on the interaction term of income decreasing type 
(SM21NI) are significantly negative at the 0.05 level, except for the first period in manufacturing sector 
and for the first and second periods in non-manufacturing sector. Coefficients on the interaction term of 
income increasing type (SM22NI) are significantly negative at the 0.10 level, except for the second period 
in non-manufacturing sector. 
  These results support the scenario that since negative changes contain lots of transitory 
elements, the strong effect of them spoils the persistence of ordinary income and net income. The results 
are also consistent with the scenario that information value of performance decreases because the income 
smoothing behavior as analyzed in Table 3 is noisy for investors,. 
  However, such an straightforward interpretation cannot be applicable to the results shown in 
Panel C. Panel C reports the results assuming that special and extra-ordinary items can be means for 
income smoothing. Over every period in non-manufacturing sector, coefficients on the interaction term of 
income decreasing type (SM31NI) are significantly positive at the 0.05 level. This implies that 
conservative accounting relieves the influence of transitory elements and increases the persistence of net 
income. On the other hand, coefficients on the interaction term of income increasing type (SM32OI) are 
significantly negative at the 0.05 level for manufacturing sector over full period. Since the latter result is 
the same as in Panels A and B, the former result for income decreasing type in non-manufacturing sector 
seems to be an idiosyncrasy. 
  As mentioned above, income smoothing examined in Table 3 seems to be a kind of 
overreaction. It is still unclear what effect such a reaction provides on the persistence of performance and 
on the estimation of future cash flows. Nevertheless, we find that coefficients on the interaction term 
between performance and dummies are statistically significant. Therefore, the multi-step income 
statement is neither redundant nor value irrelevant. 
  Table 4 reports the results concerning income smoothing of alleviating a large shock. Panel A 
presents the results in the case that a large shock occurs in core operating profits and it is lessened by   13
gains and losses form non-core operating and financing activities. Panel B presents the results in the case 
that a large shock occurs in ordinary income and it is alleviated by gains and losses from asset 
write-downs, write-offs, and settlements and so on. 
  In Panel A of Table 4, the coefficients for income decreasing type (DN1OI) are significantly 
positive almost at the 0.05 level in the third period. This result implies that conservative income 
smoothing improves the persistence of ordinary income. Contrastively, the coefficients for income 
increasing type (UP1OI) are significantly negative at the 0.05 level for all periods in manufacturing sector 
and for the second period in non-manufacturing sector. This result implies that excessive income 
squeezing increases noise in performance. Similar to the case of ordinary income, the conefficients on the 
interaction term between net income and the dummy of income decreasing (DN2NI) are significantly 
positive at the 0.05 level for all periods in manufacturing sector and for the third period in 
non-manufacturing sector. Contrastively again, the coefficients for income increasing type (UP2NI) are 
significantly negative almost at the 0.05 level for the first and third periods in manufacturing sector. 
  It is worthwhile noticing that, in the third period when Japanese economy is under depression, 
the sign of incremental coefficients on income, smoothed in the conservative direction, is positive. 
Although income smoothing is sometimes criticized, the results in Table 4 implies the possibility that 
income smoothing increase the information value of accounting performance measure. Again, we 
empirically confirm that the multi-step income statement is value relevant and that unnatural or abnormal 
movement of multi-step performance has information value, which investors could not obtain free 
without the multi-step income statement. 
 
4.  Avoidance  of  losses 
4.1 Identification of loss avoidance 
  It is alleged that firms have a tendency to avoid reporting losses. Recently, it is important 
empirical issue what factors motivate firms to avoid losses, how investors react to loss avoidance and how 
investors value the firm avoiding losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997, Degeorge et al., 1999, 
Bhattacharya et al., 2003, Glaum et al., 2004, Brown and Caylor, 2005, among others). Some research 
point out that, in capital market, small amount of negative income (loss) is seriously penalized while   14
small amount of positive income is not largely rewarded and that such asymmetrical evaluation motivates 
firms to avoid loss. If so, we expect that firms will squeeze profits or gains to avoid losses when firms 
face the risk of reporting loss. 
  For Japanese firms, Shuto (2000) and Suda and Shuto (2004) report that it is goals of 
management today to 1) avoid loss, 2) avoid negative change in performance, or 3) meet the analysts’ 
forecasts and that firms achieving those goals are more positively evaluated than firms failing. However, 
our view point is different from those studies. In this paper, we pay special attention to the difference in 
firm value between the case where firms of lower earnings power avoid loss and report positive income 
when they face the risk of reporting loss and the case where firms of higher earnings power report 
positive income without efforts of avoiding loss. It is reasonable to expect that the latter firms will be 
valued higher than the former. 
  We investigate three cases; 1) ordinary income is positive while operating profits is negative 
(income squeeze by gains from non-core operating and financing activities), 2) net income is positive 
while ordinary income is negative (income squeeze by gains from unusual and extra-ordinary activities; 
for instance, asset settlement and so on), 3) net income is positive while operating profits is negative 
(income squeeze by activities other than core operating). The regression models to analyze the cases are 
as follows. 
 
 it j j it it L it it u D OI U OI D OI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 1 3 1 2 1  (7) 
 it j j it it L it it u D NI U NI D NI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 2 3 2 2 1  (8) 
 it j j it it L it it u D NI U NI D NI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 3 3 3 2 1  (9) 
 
Equation (7); 
DL1 is unity if both operating profits and ordinary income are negative, zero otherwise. 
  U1 is unity if ordinary income is positive while operating profits is negative, zero otherwise. 
Equation (8); 
DL2 is unity if both ordinary income and net income are negative, zero otherwise. 
  U2 is unity if net income is positive while ordinary income is negative, zero otherwise.   15
Equation (9); 
DL3 is unity if both operating profits and net income are negative, zero otherwise. 
  U3 is unity if net income is positive while operating profits is negative, zero otherwise. 
 
 Dummy  variables  DL are given to the firms who report losses failing to squeeze income or 
without squeezing income. On the other hand, dummy variables U are given to the firms who succeed in 
squeezing income enough to avoid loss. 
 
4.2 Results of analysis 
  Panel A in Table 5 reports the results in the case that firms avoid negative ordinary income 
while operating profits is negative. Except for the second period in non-manufacturing sector, the 
incremental coefficients on negative ordinary income (DL1OI) are significantly negative at the 0.05 level, 
as consistent with common knowledge that losses generally contain much noise. The incremental 
coefficients on positive ordinary income for firms avoiding loss (U1OI) are significantly negative at the 
0.10 level for the third period in manufacturing sector and for the second period in non-manufacturing 
sector. Panel B, which report the results in the case that firms avoid negative net income while ordinary 
income is negative, shows the similar output to Panel A. The incremental coefficient on positive net 
income for firms avoiding loss (U2OI) is significantly negative at the 0.10 level for the third period in 
manufacturing sector. And also in Panel C, which report the results in the case that firms avoid negative 
net income while ordinary profits is negative, the incremental coefficients on positive net income for 
firms avoiding loss is (U2OI) are significantly negative at the 0.10 level for the second and third periods 
in manufacturing sector. 
  The results for the third period, when Japanese economy is under depression, is worthy of 
remark. The results in Table 5 imply that loss avoidance decreases the persistence of ordinary income and 
net income in manufacturing sector. The results are consistent with a few interpretations though they are 
not exclusive each other; for instance, 1) firms bear unnecessary costs for avoiding loss, 2) loss avoidance 
decreases cash flows of the firm in the future, 3) since investors can only uncertainly know the reason of 
loss avoidance, noise in performance becomes larger. If loss avoidance investigated here was a nominal   16
manipulation of allocation of cash flows across years, the boosted income should not have the 
relationship with the firm value and the sophisticated investors should not value the nominal increment of 
performance. The multi-step income statement enables investors to behave in such a rational manner. 
 
5.  Big  bath  accounting 
5.1 Identification of big bath accounting 
  Reporting a large loss at a burst, though its necessity is unclear, is called big bath accounting. 
Such a non-linear evaluation as a large loss is not so seriously penalized as compared with a small loss 
and a certain managerial compensation scheme that is asymmetry between positive income and losses are 
assumed to motivate firms to take a big bath. The big bath accounting is not necessarily opposite but 
closely related to loss avoidance. While firms avoid a small loss, firms take a big bath by front-loading 
future expenses when they face the risk of reporting loss that is too large to avoid (Bauman, et al. 2001, 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002). 
  Traditionally, it is alleged that firms discretionally amortize or write off the assets for big bath 
accounting (Elliot et al., 1988, Walsh et al., 1991). Peek (2004) examining firms in Netherlands reports 
that provisions for operating expenses are used as the means of big bath accounting. Although accounting 
standards for asset impairment is expected to function as a brake on big bath accounting, Riedl (2004) 
reports that, as contrary to the expectation, management opportunistically account for impairment because 
operation rules of SFAS No. 121 is ambiguous and it permits the discretion of management. The 
usefulness of loss information by big bath accounting has been mainly investigated using the cases of 
amortization and revaluation of assets. A distinguished review article Suda (2001) digests the evidence of 
prior studies and he concisely reports that the non-recurring losses are sometimes linked to the increase of 
firm value. Hirchey and Richardson (2002, 2003) adopting the event study examines the stock price 
response to amortization of goodwill. They find significant negative returns after announcement and 
conclude that investors underreact to amortization of goodwill. This result seems to be against the market 
efficiency and it is possible that perception of inefficiency motivate to take a big bath. However, since the 
reason why investors cannot rationally react is not sufficiently examined in Hirchey and Richardson 
(2002, 2003), their results should be carefully interpreted.   17
  The major concern in this paper is directed to the difference in the value relevance between the 
normal (small) loss and the large loss, which seems to be a product of big bath accounting. Some people 
may represent that a large loss does not decrease the firm value because it is just transitory and irrelevant 
and that such irrelevance becomes one of motives to take a big bath. However, the rational investors 
would negatively value the large loss that is opportunistically created by big bath accounting. In other 
words, we expect that a large loss is positively associated with stock price. It is common knowledge that 
normal loss is less value relevant than positive income and is sometimes irrelevant. Therefore, we 
concentrate on examining whether large loss is more value relevant than normal loss. 
  Similar to the previous sections, we mechanically identify the firms adopting big bath 
accounting based on the levels of operating profits, ordinary income, and net income and on the sign and 
magnitude of changes in them. The regression model with group dummies and the grouping criteria are as 
follows. 
 
 it j j it k it L it it u D NI BB NI D NI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 3 2 1  (10) 
 
We try three dummies. BB1 is unity if ordinary income and net income are negative but net 
income is smaller than ordinary income, zero otherwise. The firm satisfying this condition reports the 
larger loss in the bottom line than negative ordinary income. BB2 is unity if the change in ordinary 
income and net income are negative but the change in net income is bigger than that of ordinary income, 
zero otherwise. The firm satisfying the second condition reports the negative level of net income and the 
larger negative change in net income than that in ordinary income though it faces the negative change in 
ordinary income. BB3 is unity if firms satisfy the second condition and the magnitude of changes in both 
ordinary income and net income are above the median in industry and year, zero otherwise. Since big bath 
accounting group is a part of loss reporting firms, the coefficient  3 β presents the difference in value 
relevance between normal loss and loss of big bath accounting.   
 
5.2 Results of analysis 
  Table 6 summarizes the results. Panels A, B, C present the results of the first, second, and third   18
criterion, as explained above, respectively. The first accounting policy, which decreases the level of 
income, does not affect the value relevance of net income. On the other hand, both the second and third 
accounting policies have the peculiar effect on the value relevance of net income. In Panels B and C, the 
incremental coefficients on losses of big bath accounting (BB2NI and BB3NI) are significantly positive at 
the 0.10 level for the third period. In these Panels, the sum of the coefficient on net income and the 
incremental coefficient on normal loss ( 2 1 β β + ) is nearly equal to zero. That is, normal loss is not value 
relevant. On the other hand, the coefficients on loss of big bath accounting ( 3 2 1 β β β + + ) for the third 
period is positive though it is smaller than that of positive net income. This means that loss of big bath 
accounting is value relevant and that the firm value decreases according to the magnitude of loss. 
  We can assume a few interpretations here, too; for instance, 1) the reported large losses 
correspond to the impairments of investment projects and then the future cash flows decrease, 2) firms 
bear the unnecessary costs because of nominal manipulation, 3) since investors can only uncertainly know 
the necessity of reporting a large loss, investors conservatively discount the firm value. However, which 
scenario is most persuasive is outside of this paper. We confirm that, based on the relationship between 
multi-step performance measures, abnormal or unnatural loss is value relevant and that the multi-step 




6.  Summary  and  conclusion 
  Reporting net income by the multi-step income statement has been accused of the ambiguity of 
classification for a long time. In the background, the opponents suspect that firms will manage multi-step 
performance measures (operating profits and ordinary income) by manipulating the classification. 
However, whether net income is chosen as a performance measure in the bottom line or not, if periodical 
performance is linked to the interests of managers, it is inevitable that managers endeavor to manage or 
manipulate performance on their preferences. Even if a single statement is mandated, only the 
manipulation of classification in the year becomes ineffective. The manipulation of allocation of income 
across years will not disappear.   19
  As investigated in this paper, investors can detect the unusual or abnormal allocation patterns 
of ordinary income and net income, which have the different value relevance from normal ones, by using 
the multi-step performance information. The empirical evidence implies that current Japanese format of 
the income statement functions as a tool for screening earnings management samples. If execution costs 
and effects of manipulation on future cash flows differ according to the manipulated elements of net 
income, the variations of costs and effects should affect manager’s decision making on the choice of 
means for earnings management. Moreover, it is expected that the disclosure of manager’s decision reveal 
his or her prospect for future performance. In fact, the results in our research show the possibilities of 
such truth revealing. 
  However, our research provides no insight into the necessity to improve the current multi-step 
income statement in Japan, neither our research affirm the status quo. It is probable that the ambiguity of 
classification standard or rule makes income information much noisier and less useful and that the 
discretionary classification provides information rent for managers. The issues on the classification rule 
and on other problems contained in the current form remain for future investigation. 
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Table 1 Sample distribution 
Period  I  1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985  Subtotal 
All 530 536 542 550 555 560 567 3,840 
Manufacturing 303 304 307 310 313 316 317 2,170 
Non-manufacturing 227 232 235 240 242 244 250 1,670 
Period  II  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992  Subtotal 
All 573 576 604 645 764 876 941 4,579 
Manufacturing 322 321 330 348 418 469 491 2,699 
Non-manufacturing 251 255 274 297 346 407 450 2,280 
Period  III  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  Subtotal 
All 978 1,005 1,037 1,074 1,123 1,151 1,176 7,544 
Manufacturing 502  508  517  521  541  547  558 3,694 
Non-manufacturing 476  497  520  553  582  604  618 3,850 
          Total 
All          16,363 
Manufacturing            8,563 
Non-manufacturing            7,800 
All our sample firms close fiscal year on March. Year 1979 presents “1978 fiscal year in Japan” that starts on April 1978 and ends March 1979.   23
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Stock price P             
1979 – 85  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  1Q  Median  3Q  Max   
 All  521.489   822.099  62  218  313  526   14,500   
Manufacturing  517.837   667.199  92  231  478  547   9,990   
Non-manufacturing  526.234   987.709  62  205  280  490   14,500   
1986 – 92                 
 All  1,333.269   1,705.121  124  630  930  1,460   33,700   
Manufacturing  1,117.970   928.286  124  609  660  1,320   14,000   
Non-manufacturing 1,588.575   2,282.787 132  669  1,010  1,650    33,700   
1993 – 99                 
 All  2,238.765   29,632.825  45  405  639  1,100   1,150,000   
Manufacturing  1,962.446   32,753.943  45  390  591  987   1,150,000   
Non-manufacturing  2,503.888   26,289.429  58  425  691  1,210   704,000   
1979 – 99                 
 All  1,560.234   20,158.516  45  370  640  1,100   1,150,000   
Manufacturing  1,330.186   21,530.057  45  365  606  1,000   1,150,000   
Non-manufacturing  1,812.785   18,533.029  58  375  686  1,220   704,000   
Panel B: Ordinary Income OI            
1979 – 85  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  1Q  Median  3Q  Max   
 All  46.696   83.397  -  640.000  13.059  29.911  55.781   1,155.556   
Manufacturing  44.163   70.926  -  357.258  13.814  34.566  56.607   867.898   
Non-manufacturing 49.987   97.142  -  640.000 12.198 29.755 54.858    1,155.556   
1986 – 92                 
 All  62.344   89.454  -  604.492  20.985  41.633  74.269   1,651.003   
Manufacturing  48.485   57.220  -  604.492  18.767  33.800  62.360   727.273   
Non-manufacturing 78.768    114.486  -  337.289 25.218 51.124 94.304    1,651.003   
1993 – 99                 
 All  115.994   1,721.548  -  19,566.434 11.874 32.573 73.943    70,699.000   
Manufacturing 106.478    2,081.643  -  235.488 7.720  22.628  53.268    70,699.000   
Non-manufacturing 125.124    1,284.344  -  19,566.434 17.342 44.964 91.715    32,231.250   
1979 – 99                 
 All  83.407   1,171.070  -  19,566.434 14.623 34.897 69.663    70,699.000   
Manufacturing 72.408    1,368.396  -  604.492 12.393 29.009 57.457    70,699.000   
Non-manufacturing 95.482    906.093  -  19,566.434 17.928 42.106 85.059    32,231.250   
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Panel C: Net Income NI          
1979 – 85  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  1Q  Median  3Q  Max   
 All  21.446   42.070  -  549.000  6.454  14.004  26.170   601.852   
Manufacturing  21.044   36.011  -  370.290  7.197  16.567  27.338   382.328   
Non-manufacturing 21.968   48.827  -  549.000 5.912  12.586  24.372    601.852   
1986 – 92                 
 All  31.686   165.486  -  965.592  9.691 19.481 36.145    11,215.455   
Manufacturing  23.934   36.434  -  965.592  9.157  17.731  30.698   468.775   
Non-manufacturing 40.871    241.045  -  330.885 10.317 22.089 43.241    11,215.455   
1993 – 99                 
 All  45.070   958.332  -  33,262.238  4.572 13.283 33.970    39,769.500   
Manufacturing 51.366    1,120.986  -  549.230 3.116  10.492  25.268    39,769.500   
Non-manufacturing 39.030    770.597  -  33,262.238 5.898  17.606  41.483    14,444.500   
1979 – 99                 
 All  35.454   657.465  -  33,262.238  6.422 15.553 32.468    39,769.500   
Manufacturing 35.035    736.913  -  965.592 6.092  14.041  27.999    39,769.500   
Non-manufacturing 35.913    557.354  -  33,262.238 6.728  17.501  38.766    14,444.500   
Ordinary income is measured by adding gains and losses (including interest expenses) from non-core operating and financing 
activities to operating profits form core operating activity. Net income is measured by adding non-recurring components such as 
special items and extraordinary items, and taxes to ordinary income. 
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    SM11 OI      SM12 OI      SM13 OI     
 Coeff.  T-value  p-value Coeff. T-value  p-value Coeff. T-value  p-value Coeff. T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All               
1979 – 85 0.984  5.13  0.002 - 0.942  - 4.03  0.007 - 0.730  - 4.07  0.007 - 1.018    - 7.14  0.000 0.215 
1986 – 92 2.543 3.58 0.012 - 1.564 - 2.92 0.027 - 0.616 - 2.07 0.084 - 1.522  -  4.41 0.005 0.225
1993 – 99 1.742  6.52  0.001 - 0.746  - 5.14  0.002 - 0.976  - 7.14  0.000 - 1.330    - 7.95  0.000 0.192 
1979 – 99 1.756  8.10  0.000 - 1.084  - 5.89  0.000 - 0.774  - 6.48  0.000 - 1.290  - 10.23  0.000 0.211 
Manufacturing              
1979 – 85 1.341  6.71  0.001 - 1.427  - 3.82  0.009 - 0.862  - 3.86  0.008 - 1.369    - 8.35  0.000 0.231 
1986 – 92 2.577 4.20 0.006 - 2.170 - 4.10 0.006 - 0.795 - 3.08 0.022 - 1.894  -  5.25 0.002 0.175
1993 – 99 1.875  5.62  0.001 - 0.705  - 2.43  0.051 - 0.671  - 1.94  0.101 - 1.479    - 5.94  0.001 0.204 
1979 – 99 1.931  9.33  0.000 - 1.434  - 5.64  0.000 - 0.776  - 4.56  0.000 - 1.580  - 11.32  0.000 0.203 
Non-manufacturing              
1979 – 85 0.688  2.87  0.028 - 0.604  - 3.33  0.016 - 0.499  - 2.32  0.059 - 0.839  - 5.53  0.001 0.190 
1986 – 92 2.648 3.27 0.017 - 1.047 - 2.74 0.034 - 0.482 - 0.91 0.400 - 1.121 - 3.35 0.015 0.213
1993 – 99 1.655  8.01  0.000 - 0.800  - 5.45  0.002 - 0.916  - 4.46  0.004 - 1.329  - 9.33  0.000 0.171 
1979 – 99 1.664  6.87  0.000 - 0.817  - 6.09  0.000 - 0.632  - 4.04  0.001 - 1.097  - 8.26  0.000 0.191 
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Table 3 Value relevance of performance for income smoothing firms (1) (continued) 
Panel B   
NI 
    SM21 NI      SM22 NI      SM23 NI     
 Coeff.  T-value  p-value Coeff. T-value  p-value Coeff. T-value  p-value Coeff. T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All               
1979 – 85 1.212  4.73  0.003 - 0.635  - 1.84  0.115 - 1.144  - 2.91  0.027 - 1.407  - 4.65  0.004 0.198 
1986 – 92 3.414 3.46 0.014 - 0.998 - 1.72 0.137 - 2.030 - 1.99 0.093 - 2.316 - 2.72 0.035 0.209
1993 – 99 2.055  7.00  0.000 - 1.725  - 5.49  0.002 - 1.392  - 4.31  0.005 - 1.697  - 7.32  0.000 0.155 
1979 – 99 2.227  8.35  0.000 - 1.119  - 4.49  0.000 - 1.522  - 4.90  0.000 - 1.807  - 7.63  0.000 0.188 
Manufacturing              
1979 – 85 1.298    4.76  0.003 - 0.610  - 1.35  0.225 - 1.473  - 3.45  0.014 - 1.331  - 4.05  0.007 0.203 
1986 – 92 4.437 6.28 0.001 - 1.917 - 2.47 0.049 - 3.365 - 3.65 0.011 - 3.366 - 5.67 0.001 0.171
1993 – 99 2.464    7.12  0.000 - 1.236  - 2.45  0.050 - 1.746  - 3.63  0.011 - 1.766  - 4.60  0.004 0.182 
1979 – 99 2.733  10.66  0.000 - 1.254  - 3.51  0.002 - 2.194  - 6.29  0.000 - 2.154  - 8.39  0.000 0.185 
Non-manufacturing              
1979 – 85 1.185  2.77  0.032 - 0.662  - 1.92  0.103 - 1.168  - 3.06  0.022 - 1.948  - 9.82  0.000 0.192 
1986 – 92 2.686 2.26 0.064 - 0.275 - 0.79 0.459 - 0.899 - 1.49 0.186 - 1.386 - 1.55 0.171 0.187
1993 – 99 1.883  4.30  0.005 - 1.353  - 2.90  0.027 - 0.965  - 2.31  0.060 - 1.664  - 4.52  0.004 0.131 
1979 – 99 1.918  5.38  0.000 - 0.764  - 3.30  0.004 - 1.010  - 3.79  0.001 - 1.666  - 6.18  0.000 0.170 
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Table 3   Value relevance of performance for income smoothing firms (1)    (continued) 
Panel C 
NI  SM31 NI  SM32 NI  SM33 NI   
 Coeff.  T-value  p-value Coeff. T-value  p-value Coeff. T-value  p-value Coeff. T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All        
1979 – 85 1.089  4.74  0.003 0.532 1.20 0.274 - 0.987  - 1.96  0.097 - 1.209  - 3.55  0.012 0.198 
1986 – 92 2.979 3.37 0.015 0.022 0.34 0.745 - 1.416 - 2.33 0.058 - 1.853 - 5.84 0.001 0.199
1993 – 99 0.935  6.43  0.001 0.626 2.06 0.085 - 0.507  - 1.03  0.341 - 0.598  - 1.73  0.134 0.141 
1979 – 99 1.668  7.98  0.000 0.393 1.91 0.070 - 0.970  - 3.19  0.005 - 1.220  - 5.28  0.000 0.179 
Manufacturing              
1979 – 85 1.254  4.76  0.003 - 0.333  - 0.68  0.524 - 1.493  - 2.95  0.026 - 1.264  - 3.89  0.008 0.200 
1986 – 92 3.616 6.29 0.001 - 1.067 - 1.13 0.303 - 2.302 - 3.03 0.023 - 2.641 - 5.99 0.001 0.155
1993 – 99 1.788  5.88  0.001 - 0.323  - 1.54  0.175 - 1.257  - 2.52  0.045 - 1.107  - 2.73  0.034 0.171 
1979 – 99 2.219  10.01  0.000 - 0.574  - 1.97  0.063 - 1.684  - 5.03  0.000 - 1.671  - 6.75  0.000 0.175 
Non-manufacturing              
1979 – 85 0.195 1.94 0.101 1.504 3.78 0.009 - 0.207 - 0.47 0.653 - 0.969 - 1.87 0.111 0.202
1986 – 92 1.627 1.50 0.185 1.480 2.51 0.046  0.113 - 0.91 0.396 - 0.289 - 0.44 0.672 0.189
1993 – 99 0.697 4.19 0.006 1.318 2.89 0.028  0.002  0.31 0.766 - 0.488 - 0.77 0.472 0.131
1979 – 99 0.840  3.72  0.001  1.434  5.22  0.000  - 0.030  - 0.84  0.411  - 0.582  - 1.87  0.076  0.174 
Regression Models: 
it j j it it it it it u D OI SM OI SM OI SM OI P + + + + + + = ∑γ β β β β α 13 4 12 3 11 2 1  (1) 
 it j j it it it it it u D NI SM NI SM NI SM NI P + + + + + + = ∑γ β β β β α 23 4 22 3 21 2 1  (2) 
 it j j it it it it it u D NI SM NI SM NI SM NI P + + + + + + = ∑γ β β β β α 33 4 32 3 31 2 1  (3) 
Djs are industry dummies. In equation (1), SM11 is unity if  ∆OI is negative while  ∆OP is positive, zero otherwise. SM12 is unity if  ∆OI is positive while  ∆OP is negative, zero otherwise. SM13 is unity 
if both  ∆OP and  ∆OI are negative, zero otherwise. In equation (2), SM21 is unity if  ∆NI is negative while  ∆OI is positive, zero otherwise. SM22 is unity if  ∆NI is positive while  ∆OI is negative, 
zero otherwise. SM23 is unity if both  ∆OI and  ∆NI are negative, zero otherwise. In equation (3), SM31 is unity if  ∆NI is negative while both  ∆OP and  ∆OI are positive, zero otherwise. SM32 is unity 
if  ∆NI is positive while both  ∆OP and  ∆OI are negative, zero otherwise. SM33 is unity if all of  ∆OP,  ∆OI,  ∆NI are negative, zero otherwise. The definitions of variables are provided in Table 2 
other than OP, which represents operating profits from core operating activity.   28
Table 4   Value relevance of performance for income smoothing firms (2) 
Panel A    OI     DN 1 OI     UP 1OI      
 Coefficient  T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All            
1979 – 85  0.420 5.61 0.001 - 0.061 - 0.46 0.664 - 0.452 - 2.76 0.033 0.175
1986 – 92  2.028 3.30 0.016  0.561  1.25 0.258 - 1.363 - 4.07 0.007 0.209
1993 – 99  0.963 7.44 0.000  0.679  3.94 0.008 - 0.439 - 1.95 0.100 0.155
1979 – 99  1.137 7.21 0.000  0.393  1.87 0.077 - 0.751 - 4.95 0.000 0.180
Manufacturing            
1979 – 85  0.648 4.49 0.004 - 0.174 - 0.52 0.624 - 0.871 - 2.97 0.025 0.1846
1986 – 92  1.788 3.47 0.013  0.444  1.23 0.263 - 1.383 - 2.64 0.039 0.1562
1993 – 99  1.113 5.83 0.001  0.895  2.73 0.034 - 1.065 - 2.89 0.028 0.1781
1979 – 99  1.183 7.55 0.000  0.388  1.79 0.089 - 1.106 - 5.09 0.000 0.1729
Non-manufacturing           
1979 – 85  0.252 2.13 0.077 0.020 - 0.54 0.612 - 0.283 - 1.65 0.151 0.143
1986 – 92  2.515 3.50 0.013 0.359  0.50 0.635 - 1.643 - 3.71 0.010 0.209
1993 – 99  0.868 6.05 0.001 0.818  2.35 0.057 - 0.256 - 1.27 0.250 0.123
1979 – 99  1.212 5.80 0.000 0.399  0.90 0.379 - 0.727 - 3.50 0.002 0.159
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Table 4   Value relevance of performance for income smoothing firms (2) (continued) 
Panel B    NI     DN 2 NI     UP 2 NI      
 Coefficient  T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All            
1979 – 85  0.411 5.38 0.002 0.880 3.04 0.023 - 1.790 - 2.29 0.062 0.167
1986 – 92  1.971 3.25 0.018 0.856 1.35 0.226 - 1.006 - 1.85 0.114 0.180
1993 – 99  0.598 9.20 0.000 3.384 9.52 0.000 - 0.436 - 1.25 0.258 0.138
1979 – 99  1.059 7.32 0.000 1.586 4.68 0.000 - 1.104 - 3.28 0.004 0.164
Manufacturing            
1979 – 85  0.626 4.25 0.005 1.180 2.73 0.034 - 1.792 - 2.47 0.049 0.170
1986 – 92  2.307 4.67 0.003 2.753 2.32 0.060 - 1.775 - 1.50 0.184 0.147
1993 – 99  0.914 9.87 0.000 3.498 4.46 0.004 - 1.464 - 2.34 0.058 0.165
1979 – 99  1.282 9.17 0.000 2.477 5.13 0.000 - 1.677 - 3.77 0.001 0.161
Non-manufacturing           
1979 – 85  0.175 1.80 0.122 0.601  1.85 0.113 - 1.987 - 1.74 0.133 0.148
1986 – 92  1.792 2.06 0.085 0.322  0.63 0.552 - 1.057 - 1.75 0.130 0.166
1993 – 99  0.473 8.89 0.000 3.178 10.85 0.000 - 0.332 - 1.12 0.305 0.103
1979 – 99  0.814 4.93 0.000 1.367  3.85 0.001 - 1.125 - 2.70 0.014 0.139
Regression Models: 
it j j it it it it u D OI UP OI DN OI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 1 3 1 2 1  (4) 
 it j j it it it it u D NI UP NI DN NI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 2 3 2 2 1  (5) 
DN1 is unity if, while the positive change in operating profits is above the median, the change in ordinary income is less than the median, zero otherwise, and UP1 is unity, in reverse, if the negative change in 
operating profits is above the median while the change in ordinary income is less than the median. DN2 is unity if, while the positive change in ordinary income is above the median, the change in net income is 
less than the median, zero otherwise, and UP2 is unity, in reverse, if the negative change in ordinary income is above the median while the change in net income is less than the median. 
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Table 5 Value relevance of performance for loss avoiding firms 
Panel A    OI     D L 1 OI     U1OI      
 Coefficient  T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All            
1979 – 85  0.840 4.53 0.004 - 0.758 - 3.23 0.018 - 1.338 - 1.34 0.250 0.193
1986 – 92  2.514 3.06 0.022 - 3.708 - 3.03 0.023  1.946 - 1.41 0.209 0.219
1993 – 99  1.422 4.43 0.004 - 1.060 - 3.52 0.013 - 1.435 - 2.10 0.081 0.167
1979 – 99  1.592 6.38 0.000 - 1.842 - 5.88 0.000 - 0.164 - 2.93 0.009 0.193
Manufacturing            
1979 – 85  1.150 5.63 0.001 - 1.085 - 3.55 0.012 - 4.851 - 1.02 0.367 0.2091
1986 – 92  2.676 3.28 0.017 - 3.910 - 3.40 0.014  7.201  0.08 0.940 0.1794
1993 – 99  1.834 3.72 0.010 - 1.361 - 2.47 0.048 - 0.858 - 1.99 0.094 0.1978
1979 – 99  1.887 6.50 0.000 - 2.119 - 5.48 0.000  1.060 - 1.58 0.132 0.1954
Non-manufacturing           
1979 – 85  0.619 2.31 0.060 - 0.849 - 2.51 0.046 - 11.681 - 1.99 0.141 0.165
1986 – 92  2.612 3.21 0.018 - 8.426 - 1.26 0.253  -  3.040 - 1.96 0.098 0.212
1993 – 99  1.245 5.17 0.002 - 0.905 - 2.95 0.026  -  0.351 - 0.59 0.576 0.136
1979 – 99  1.492 5.70 0.000 - 3.393 - 3.85 0.001  -  3.914 - 2.04 0.057 0.171
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Table 5 Value relevance of performance for loss avoiding firms (continued) 
Panel B    NI     D L 2 NI     U2 NI      
 Coefficient  T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All            
1979 – 85  0.997 4.14 0.006 - 0.783 - 2.25 0.066 - 1.035 - 2.31 0.060 0.181
1986 – 92  3.282 3.09 0.021 - 4.541 - 2.65 0.038 - 1.003 - 2.23 0.067 0.196
1993 – 99  0.954 7.46 0.000 - 0.501 - 2.23 0.068 - 0.292 - 1.76 0.129 0.130
1979 – 99  1.745 7.19 0.000 - 1.942 - 4.13 0.001 - 0.777 - 3.75 0.001 0.169
Manufacturing            
1979 – 85  1.318 4.75 0.003 - 0.704 - 2.66 0.037 - 1.176 - 1.76 0.129 0.193
1986 – 92  4.212 3.80 0.009 - 5.242 - 2.73 0.034 - 1.417 - 2.39 0.054 0.162
1993 – 99  1.714 5.51 0.002 - 0.975 - 2.00 0.093 - 1.059 - 2.02 0.090 0.164
1979 – 99  2.415 8.20 0.000 - 2.307 - 4.40 0.000 - 1.217 - 3.62 0.002 0.173
Non-manufacturing           
1979 – 85  0.627 1.46 0.195 - 1.022 - 2.45 0.050 - 0.297 - 0.70 0.511 0.164
1986 – 92  2.449 2.32 0.059 - 9.195 - 1.47 0.192 73.483  0.50 0.639 0.172
1993 – 99  0.770 9.54 0.000 - 0.499 - 2.45 0.050 - 0.837 - 0.84 0.432 0.095
1979 – 99  1.282 4.81 0.000 - 3.572 - 3.07 0.006 21.648 - 0.36 0.723 0.144
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Table 5 Value relevance of performance for loss avoiding firms (continued) 
Panel C    NI     D L 3 NI     U3 NI      
 Coefficient  T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All            
1979 – 85  0.882 4.12 0.006 - 0.715 - 1.16 0.292  4.911 - 0.75 0.479 0.178
1986 – 92  3.135 3.45 0.014 - 4.339 - 2.23 0.067 - 1.585 - 3.07 0.028 0.195
1993 – 99  0.721 8.27 0.000 - 0.160 - 0.30 0.776 - 0.243 - 1.66 0.148 0.128
1979 – 99  1.579 7.83 0.000 - 1.738 - 2.23 0.037  1.158 - 3.03 0.007 0.167
Manufacturing            
1979 – 85  1.037 4.16 0.006 - 0.746 - 1.98 0.095  2.697 - 0.42 0.688 0.187
1986 – 92  3.810 4.13 0.006 - 4.921 - 2.43 0.051 - 0.501 - 2.16 0.083 0.156
1993 – 99  1.406 8.31 0.000 - 0.640 - 1.95 0.099 - 0.772 - 2.43 0.051 0.160
1979 – 99  2.084 8.85 0.000 - 2.102 - 3.78 0.001  0.523 - 2.27 0.035 0.168
Non-manufacturing           
1979 – 85  0.602 1.76 0.129  -  2.914 - 2.25 0.066   5.627  0.45 0.695 0.167
1986 – 92  2.179 2.25 0.066 - 31.341 - 1.24 0.260 271.796  1.11 0.384 0.178
1993 – 99  0.558 8.38 0.000  -  0.002  0.08 0.941   -  9.663 - 2.09 0.105 0.096
1979 – 99  1.113 4.98 0.000 - 11.419 - 1.71 0.103  71.269  0.76 0.468 0.147
Regression Models: 
 it j j it it L it it u D OI U OI D OI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 1 3 1 2 1  (7) 
 it j j it it L it it u D NI U NI D NI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 2 3 2 2 1  (8) 
 it j j it it L it it u D NI U NI D NI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 3 3 3 2 1  (9) 
In equation (7), DL1 is unity if both operating profits and ordinary income are negative, zero otherwise. U1 is unity if ordinary income is positive while operating profits is negative, zero otherwise. In equation 
(8), DL2 is unity if both ordinary income and net income are negative, zero otherwise. U2 is unity if net income is positive while ordinary income is negative, zero otherwise. In equation (9), DL3 is unity if both 
operating profits and net income are negative, zero otherwise. U3 is unity if net income is positive while operating profits is negative, zero otherwise. 
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Table 6 Value relevance of performance for firms taking a big bath 
Panel A    NI     DL NI     BB1 NI      
 Coefficient  T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All            
1979 – 85  1.020 4.32 0.005 - 0.771 - 2.45 0.050 - 0.005 0.40 0.701 0.181
1986 – 92  3.065 2.67 0.037 - 9.135 - 1.16 0.288  4.737 0.06 0.958 0.195
1993 – 99  1.859 3.67 0.010 - 1.488 - 2.67 0.037 - 0.048 0.21 0.844 0.147
1979 – 99  1.981 6.06 0.000 - 3.798 - 3.50 0.002  1.562 0.31 0.757 0.174
Manufacturing            
1979 – 85  1.297 4.81 0.003  -  1.604 - 3.98 0.007  0.588 1.93 0.101 0.189
1986 – 92  4.118 3.48 0.013 - 10.626 - 2.08 0.083  5.686 0.85 0.426 0.160
1993 – 99  2.167 2.98 0.025  -  1.564 - 1.99 0.094 - 0.234 0.38 0.719 0.175
1979 – 99  2.527 6.55 0.000  -  4.598 - 4.15 0.001  2.013 1.44 0.164 0.175
Non-manufacturing           
1979 – 85  0.744 1.96 0.097  -  0.508 - 1.76 0.129 - 3.094 - 1.51 0.191 0.168
1986 – 92  2.297 2.20 0.070 - 10.717 - 0.07 0.950  1.189 - 0.37 0.722 0.169
1993 – 99  1.780 5.04 0.002  -  1.480 - 3.63 0.011  0.023  0.20 0.851 0.111
1979 – 99  1.607 4.93 0.000  -  4.235 - 2.70 0.014 - 0.504 - 1.21 0.242 0.149
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Table 6 Value relevance of performance for firms taking a big bath (continued) 
Panel B    NI     DL NI     BB2 NI    
 Coefficient  T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All            
1979 – 85  1.039 4.25 0.005 - 0.671 - 1.66 0.147 - 0.265 - 1.36 0.223 0.190
1986 – 92  3.056 2.62 0.039 - 3.777 - 1.37 0.221 - 4.473 - 1.33 0.232 0.194
1993 – 99  1.876 3.68 0.010 - 1.730 - 3.05 0.023  0.338  3.21 0.018 0.148
1979 – 99  1.990 6.06 0.000 - 2.059 - 3.44 0.003 - 1.467 - 0.02 0.981 0.177
Manufacturing            
1979 – 85  1.274 4.71 0.003 - 0.568 - 0.98 0.367 - 0.677 - 1.05 0.335 0.192
1986 – 92  4.100 3.47 0.013 - 4.366 - 1.76 0.128 - 5.303 - 1.88 0.109 0.158
1993 – 99  2.184 3.02 0.024 - 1.789 - 2.40 0.053  0.393  2.06 0.085 0.177
1979 – 99  2.519 6.53 0.000 - 2.241 - 3.03 0.007 - 1.863 - 0.51 0.616 0.176
Non-manufacturing           
1979 – 85  0.788 2.06 0.085 - 1.111 - 6.54 0.001 - 0.331 - 1.17 0.294 0.152
1986 – 92  2.251 2.20 0.070 - 7.934 - 0.78 0.465  2.469  0.05 0.961 0.172
1993 – 99  1.809 4.36 0.005 - 1.792 - 4.14 0.006  0.318  2.46 0.049 0.112
1979 – 99  1.616 4.79 0.000 - 3.613 - 3.15 0.005  0.792  0.21 0.839 0.145
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Table 6 Value relevance of performance for firms taking a big bath (continued) 
Panel C    NI     DL NI     BB3 NI      
 Coefficient  T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Coefficient T-value  p-value Adj.  R2 
All            
1979 – 85  1.023 4.12 0.006 - 0.724 - 2.16 0.074 - 0.410 - 1.28 0.249 0.184
1986 – 92  3.062 2.67 0.037 - 3.784 - 1.14 0.298 - 4.783 - 2.40 0.053 0.195
1993 – 99  1.886 3.70 0.010 - 1.739 - 3.12 0.021  0.357  2.34 0.058 0.149
1979 – 99  1.991 6.06 0.000 - 2.082 - 3.51 0.002 - 1.612 - 0.46 0.650 0.176
Manufacturing            
1979 – 85  1.275 4.74 0.003 - 0.664 - 1.42 0.205 - 0.513 - 0.68 0.524 0.191
1986 – 92  4.091 3.46 0.014 - 4.321 - 1.74 0.133 - 5.253 - 1.43 0.203 0.159
1993 – 99  2.188 3.02 0.023 - 1.799 - 2.38 0.055  0.445  3.99 0.007 0.176
1979 – 99  2.518 6.55 0.000 - 2.261 - 3.28 0.004 - 1.774  0.05 0.958 0.175
Non-manufacturing           
1979 – 85  0.741 1.99 0.093 - 1.085 - 4.67 0.003 - 0.702 - 1.00 0.390 0.156
1986 – 92  2.295 2.26 0.064 - 7.753 - 0.61 0.564 - 0.538 - 0.79 0.487 0.172
1993 – 99  1.828 4.44 0.004 - 1.818 - 4.25 0.005  0.448  2.27 0.064 0.112
1979 – 99  1.621 4.80 0.000 - 3.552 - 3.03 0.007 - 0.122 - 0.80 0.439 0.147
Regression Model: 
 it j j it k it L it it u D NI BB NI D NI P + + + + + = ∑γ β β β α 3 2 1  (10) 
BB1 is unity if ordinary income is negative and net income is smaller than ordinary income, zero otherwise. BB2 is unity if the change in ordinary income is negative and the change in net income is smaller 
than that of ordinary income and the level of net income is negative, zero otherwise. BB3 is unity if firms satisfy the condition of BB2 and the magnitude of changes in both ordinary income and net income are 
above the median in industry and year, zero otherwise. 
 